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THE VALUE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE.
By ARunMus STEWART.
THERE is a wide difference of opinion in the reported
cases in regard to the value of the evidence of experts,
ranging from the extreme of commendation to that of con-
demnation; and it is utterly impossible to deduce any
general rule from them, for, founded as they are on the-
personal experience, impressions or predilections of the
writers, they are the expressions of prejudice rather than of
judgment, and present as great a variety as the phases of
human nature and modern education. In some instances,,
perhaps, the cause lies on the surface. It is only natural
that a criminal lawyer, who has all his life relied on expert
evidence to save his clients from justly-deserved punish-
ment, should have the very highest opinion of iti utility,
and should, upon his elevation to the bench, give utterance
to that opinion ; while it is equally natural that a district
attorney, who his had his well-earned laurels snatched from
his brow by the skilful use of such evidence, should in the
like case express his utter contempt for it. As a rule,
therefore, text-writers have either preferred to pass the sub-
ject by rather than waste time in the hopeless effort to,
bring order out of chaos, or have contented themselves
wilh simply adducing the arguments urged on both sides of
the question, leaving the reader to make his choice, un-
influenced by any opinion of theirs.
There is one notable exception, however. Judge
TAYLOR, in his work on "Evidence," 1 does not hesitate to
express in unqualified terms his very low estimate of the
value of the testimony of experts. "These gentlemen,'"
he says, "are usually required to speak, not to facts, but to
oihinions; and when this is the case, it is often quite sur-
prising to see with -what facility and to what an extent their
views can be made to correspond with the wishes or the
18th Ed., 58.
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interests of the parties who call them. They, do not,
indeed, wilfully, misrepresent what they think; but their
judgments become so warped by regarding the subject in
one point of view that, even when conscientiously disposed,
they are incapable of expressing a candid opinion. Being
zealous partisans, their belief becomes synonymous with
S-faith as defined by the Apostle, and it too often is but ' the
substance of things hobed for, the evidence of things not
seen.'")
It'is evident to any, one who has'given any 'considera-
tion to the subject, that 'this, besides being the opinioA of
an author of great weight, very fairly rep1reknts the-popular
.estimate of expert evidence as voiced in the- conversation of
men,, in the newspapers and-other periodicals, and even -at
times in stray remarks let fall from the jury; but does it
-fairly represent the actual substantive value of such evidence.
.and the weight' that should justly attach to it? 'It can
'hardly be .questioned that, theoretically at' least, it ought
"-6t to be correct. As expert evidence is confined to matters
that are beyond the reach of the ordinary intelligence and
'education of men, the testimony of those who have made
these" maiters their special study -ought to carry great
'weight to the minds of those who, like the aveage jury,
-now nothing whatever about them unless so iAstructed.
'The opinions of an architect on the proper construction of.
.a building, of an engineer on the tensile strength of a
,girder, of a- physician on the cause of death or the proper
treatment of a wound, are, in common with numberless
other such, the sole guides by which the jury can arrive at
*n intelligent decision of the case, and'ought, therefore, to
-be almost, ff not quite, conclusive; and yet everyday
-experience proves that they are not. What is the reason
-of this apparent anomaly?
In the first 'instance, it arises from the very nature of
,expert evidence. No matter how learned or how famous the
witness may be, his testimony is only an expression of his
personal opinion, based, it is true, on a proved state of facts
.and a careful study of similar phenomena, but none the less
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an opinion pure and simple. Now, it is an unquestionable
fact that no man is bound to, accept the opinions of another;
-but he may, if he chooses, set up his own ignorant pre-
judices in opposition to the judgment of the most enlightened
scholar, and there is no way of calling him to account for it.
It is, therefore, the inherent vice of an opinion that it can
never be conclusive, but is wholly at the mercy of the jury
.to accept or disregard as they please. Whatever, then, may
"be the theoretical value of expert evidence, it is clear that
its actual value depends wholly upon the weight the jury
see fit to allow it; and this being in every case an unknown
quantity, its practical value is equally uncertain. Yet in
many cases it is the only evidence that can be given. In
-murder by poisoning, for example, the proof of the cause
-of death must almost always rest upon the evidence of the
experts who have examined and analyzed the viscera of the
-deceased, and the jury are practically forced to accept their
-conclusions, if uncontroverted, or to acquit the accused,
The theoretical, as well as practical, value of expert
-evidence is seriously impaired by its uncertainty and con-
tradictoriness. When the experts brought forward by both
sides agree on a matter, there are very strong grounds for:
-believing their opinion correct, and great weight ought to
b-e given to it; but, unhappily, such agreement is one of
the rarest phenomena of nature, fit to be classed with the
seven wonders of the world. Mr. Justice .STORY has
-remarked on this point:' "In all my experience P" can
scarcely recollect a single instance in which the general
-question whether the principles of two machines were the
same or different has not produced from different witnesses,
.equally credible and equally intelligent, opposite answers."
This, no doubt, has its rise partly in that subjective ten-
dency of the human mind that leads it to lay undue stress
-upon its own conclusions, and to display an irrational dis-
xegard of the opinions 6f others, and even of plain facts,
forming the mainspring of what is termed professional
jealousy. But it is also in large measure due to the inexact-
'Barrett v. Hill, ii Mason, 447.
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ness of much of what is -niscaled scientific reasoning, and
,the unconfessed ignorance that in reality exists regarding
many of the phenomena of nature upon which the theories
,.of scientists are based. "If the trumpet give forth an
'uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself for the battle?"
It is impossible to place any confidence in conclusions drawn
from premises which our past experience leads us to suspect
may the next day be proved by some new discovery to be
• non-existent or misunderstood. There is no more general
truth in nature than that "things.are not what they seem."
Yet the color-blind man is fully persuaded that he is justi-
fled in insisting, on the evidence of his senses, that the
leaves and the ripe cherries are of the same color, and in
refusing to accept the declaration of the man of normal
.'vision that they are really different. So, too, the scientist,
blinded by his own pet theory, is, from his own point of
view, equally justifiable in contradicting the statements of
his brother of less prejudice, or opposite tendency. It is a
curious proof of the extent to which mental perversion can
prevail, that some one can be found to champion any side
of a question, and to controvert any of the facts and theories
of 'science -that are generally considered firmly established.
There is a colored gentleman down South who, -at this late
day, declares that "the sun do move;" and there is a
white gentleman in New York wha is devoting his energies
to the attempted overthrow, by a very specious logical
fallacy, of the current theories as to the nature and origin
of light, heat and sound, a very Don Quixote in the scien-
tific-world. These, especially the former, would, it- is true,
hardly be permitted to testify as experts; but their opinions
are hardly less wild than many held by men of more
prominence. What would the medical profession. think of
a member of their body who diagnosed a case of' barber's
itch as a blind- carbuncle, or a ruptured capillary as a
scrofulous growth? Yet this has been done by a very
respectable physician, whose testimony as an expert would
have been received in any court.
Of course, where there is uncertainty in regard to the
THB VALUE OF EXPERT EVIDENCE.
fundamental phenomena, and the processes by which they
develop, there is much room for bona fide difference of
opinion, as well as for ignorance, and it is very difficult to
tell which is which; but at the same time it gives rise to many
remarkable declarations. Not many years ago a prisoner
in a penitentiary in one of the eastern States killed a
.keeper in his cell, no one else being present. On his trial
the defence of insanity was set up; and one of the most
reputable and successful physicians of that city, who was
beyond all suspicion of venality, testified with the utmost
positiveness that the defendant was insane. Fortunately,
the jury disregarded this testimony, and found the man
guilty. As the prisoner was leaving the court room he said
to the officer in whose charge he was: "That lawyer of mine
was a fool for sticking to that insanity plea when he saw the
jury took no stock in it. Why didn't he claim self-defense?
No one saw me kill him, and they couldn'f have proved that
he did not attack me first.)" In the light of this statement
what shall be said of the physician's evidence?
This room for variance of honest opinion is especially
noticeable in this very matter of medical evidence. One
cause of it is certainly the very rapid advance and the con-
sequent radical changes in that profession. Matters which
ten or twenty years ago would have been facts are now
shown to be as baseless as a mirage, and things which then
were undreamed of hre now the facts of the present. In
guch a state of affairs the older men, who are too much
pressed by their professional duties to keep pace with these
changes, find themselves necessarily at odds with the
younger men, to whom these new things are the very
A B C of their medical training. This, of course, intro-
duces an element of confusion and uncertainty, and when
a young man, fresh from France or Germany, gravely testi-
fies that a gray-haired practitioner, old enough to be his
grandfather, perhaps, knows nothing of the matter in
hand, the sympathies of the jury are all with the older
man, and tend to seriously affect the real value of the
other's testimony.
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In the matter of insani.ty, the evidence. of experts is
especially unsatisfactory. -Apart from the fact that it is
apt to be conflicting, it is untrustworthy, for the reason
-that medicine has a definition of insanity differing widely
-and radically from that of the law. In the purview of the
- former, insanity is any unsettling of the mental balance,
irrespective'of comprehension and responsibility; while to
the latter the only legally recognized insanity is that which
destroys responsibility or intelligence. ' This difference has
led-to some sharp expressions of the judicial opinion of
the medical definition of insanity. "-Unfortunately fcr
the administration of justice, persons are sometimes found.
.- who with small experience 'and large 'conceit. have-. suc-
deeded in formulating theories under, which,. if properly
-applied, there would -be hardly enough sane persons found
- .to sit upon juries or attend to business."' People always
find what they look for if they look long enough and close,
enough, and the' expert alienist, who spends his life in
ferreting out insanity, will light upon supposed traces of it
-where no other.'man would ever suspect its existence, and
p an then, from his point of view, testify with a clear con-
.,science to -what is essentially,, in 'relation to the- true state
of affairs, an error, not to say an untruth.
So, too, medici1 experts are contnually, making
alleged discoveries that, until their true effects and rela-
tions become fully known, tend to seiously embarrass the
administration of justice. by introducing new elements of
uncertainty. In the late' trial of Dr. Buchanan, in New
York, -Where the .prosecution set up the theory that the
deceased was poisoned by morphine (a vegetable alkaloid),
traces of which it was testified were found in the viscera,
the defense introduced evidence tending to shake that of
the experts for the prosecution,' to the effect that certain of
the ptomaines and leucomaines (products of animal decom-
position), produce reactions similar to those of certain of
the vegetable alkaloids, and that therefore it could not be
said with certainty what was the substance that .produced
1 Peo. v. Finey, 38 Mich., 482.
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the reaction. Here, it is' clear, is an element of uncer-
tainty that would last until the differences in the effects of
these substances, dnd the true tests for distinguishing
them, were found, were it* not for the fact that the pto-
maines are so offensive as to be rarely taken into the
stomach (tyrotoxicon, found in ice-cream and cheese, being
the most prominent exception), and that those formed in
the alimentary canal are neutralized by some secretion of
the body.
Another serious fault of expert testimony is its unin-
telligibility. Every science has its own technical terms,
-which are so much Greek or Hebrew to the average jury-
man. What would the Prdinary man make of this answer
to a question whether a certain dose of a prescription con-
taining chloral would have been dangerous: "Not unless
the patient was idiosyncratic to chloral? " And this word
is mild when compared to some medical and chemical
terms (for which the curious may consult special diction-
aries). It is no wonder that the foreman of the jury that
tried Dr. Buchanan remarked that he thought that after
the trial was over they ought all to receive diplomas as
scientists; nor that another juryman declared that he had
experienced seventeen different kinds of coma during the
course of the trial.
It ought not to be any cause for wonder that, with
their ears buffeted by words they never heard before, and
1heir attention called away from the salient features of the
case by ceaseless wrangles over scientific matters they do
not understand and care. nothing about, the jury become
afflicted with a sort of mental nausea, and incontinently
reject the whole undigested mass. A part of it they niust
reject whenever it is conflicting. "Who shall decide when
doctors disagree?" Certainly not a body of men wholly
ignorant of the subject-matter of the testimony.. Would
any one but a chemist presume to pass upon the question
whether a test should be made with animal or vegetable
indol, or would any one but a physician risk the assertion
that atropine would conceal the presence of morphine in
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the system without affecting the morpline, coma?' f
ihen, these gentlemen are not agreed on these or.similar
,'points, what are the jury' to do ? When'. a physician of
wide reputation, profound learning and vast experience;
testifies directly that certain blood stains -are caused by
human blood-* and another of equal experience, learnng
and.reputation testifies as explicitly that it is impossible to
declare with certainty the origin .of any blood-stains, and-.
that no- physician with any regard bfo his reputation woul.d,
.asert hat it was the blood of any particular animal, whom.
shall they believe? In such-case, and it'is by far the most
common, they cannot dlecide in any true sense of the-word;
they can only choose at random whom. to credit, and of.
course will always choose in the .line. of their private incli-
nations and prejudices.
There is another cause of' the waning prestige 'of
expert evidence, for which the lawyer is chiefly responsible;.
that is, the excessive length to which, such evidence is
2' pushed, both in. direct and cross-examination, and the con-
'sequent multiplication of side issues and the obscuration of'
-the'main point. It is no uncommon thing nowadays for a
- murder trial to consume three, four or more weeks, and to>
put anywhere from six to a dozen experts 'on the stand.
, With each of these comes an investigation into his credi-'
bility, his standing, his learuniag, his means of knowledge,
- until the jury are fairly bewildered. It has its advantage
for the defence in this, that it may cause the jury to lose-
" sikht of the main issue; but if that is its only object, it
dges not add to its value or respectability. And If thejury
once get an idea that such is its purpose, it becomes a
boomerang ana -recoils with fatal effect on the head of him
who employs it. But even when used in a perfectly legiti-
-mate way, it is often carried to the verge of absurdity, in.
view at least of the probable effect it will have on the jury.
They cannot be expected to follow out the course of logical
reasoning that is developing itself in the testimony, for'
they are not fitted, either by-nature or -education, to do so.
The matter is, 'therefore, exhausted for them long before
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the lawier arrives at the point at which he has been aiming,
and the most beautiful chain of thought thus brought out
is often, it is to be feared, not only of no value, so far as its
effect on them is concerned,' but even positively detrimental.
One consideration that materially qualifies the value of
the evidence of the experts for the defence is that when they
have had no opportunity to examine the material on which
the evidence for the prosecution is based, their testimony
czn have no affirmative basis, but must be purely negative.
That is, they can only testify that, assuming the facts
testified to by the witnesses for the prosecution to be true,
they think the deductions made therefrom are unwarranted.
This sort of evidence is necessarily weak. It merely
amounts to an opinion than another man's opinion is wrong,
without afill knowledge of the facts on which that opinion
is based, and is therefore certainly not entitled to the same
weight. In the recent Harris case' the evidence of the
experts for the prosecution was positive that the deceased had
been poisoned with morphine; but the experts for the defence
declared that with such symptoms as those testified to no
accurate opinion of the cause of death could be given, and
that it might have been uremic poisoning, or hemorrhage
of the pons varolii. Would any one for a moment dream
of permitting positive evidence of qualified experts to be
overborne or even nullified by such a mere hypothesis?
It is safe to say that no jury would grant it the least con-
sideration; and in point of fact, in the case cited it had no
effect upon either judge, jury or higher court.
This same *fault vitiates all evidence given by means
of what is called a hypothetical question, stigmatized by
the New York Times, in commenting on the Buchanan
case, as "a method that always, being based on a series of
suppositions, simply opens up a field of conjecture in which
the experts can theorize to their heart's content, while the
lawyers wrangle, the court scolds and the jury yawns and
wonders what it all means." But this has the additional
vice that when, as sbmetimes happens, the question covers
1 33 N. E. Rep., 65.
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a column or more of a newspaper, the jury have forgottein
the beginning long before the 'middle is reached, and the
middle long before the end; and are no wiser when the
answer 'is at last given than they were before, and conse-
qufently do not permit it to affect their decision in the least.
Did the matter stop here expert evidence might still
come out of the investigation with unhnpaired respecta-
bilty, though shorn of much of its fancied importance..
But there is another and darker side td the question-the
unconscious bias that the employed naturally has to sub-
serv6 the interests of his employer, and the more than sus-
pected venality of some expts. "Hardly any weight,"
said Lord CAMPBIM, in the Tracy Peerage Case,' is to be
given to the evidence of what are called scientific witnesses;'
: they come ivith a bias on their minds to support the cause
in which they are emb.rked." ,
S ".It must be pginf-lly evident," remarked Judge
:- m uPL in. Grigsby v. Clear Lake Water Co., . "to every
practitioner, that these witnesses are generally but adroit
advocates of the theory upon which the party calling thein
" rdies,,rather than impartial experts, uponwhose superior
judginent and learning. the jury can safely rely. Even
- men of the highest character and integrity are apt to be
prejudiced in favor of the'partyiby whom they are employed,
• - and, as a. matter of course, no. exprt is called. until the
party calling him is assured that his opinion will 'be
favorable."
'This tendency is very much enhanced by the vicious
pr.actice of paying experts more than the fees legally de-.
mandable, a practice now sanctioned by law in England and
many of tte States of the Union to the extent of allowing
such extra fees to be taxed'as costs. Of course, when a
matter of hundreds of thousands of dollars is at stake the
.parties can afford to pay experts large fees for favorable
testimony, especially when there is a chance of reimbursing
themselves; and equally of course, the expert who has been
1 io C1. & Fin., 154.
2 40 Cal., 4o5.
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liberally paid is actuated by a laudable desire to give his
employer his money's worth. Large sums are thus paid
at times. It is reported that in one will contest, involving
about $300,000, a certain expert in handwriting was offered
$5000 if he would testify that.the signature of the testator
was forged. To his honor be it said he refused the bribe.
But would all experts have done so? No one who has any
knowledge of human nature will answer that question- in
the affirmative.
The danger of venality in this kind of evidence appears
yet more clearly from the fact that the profession of an
expert has become a recognized branch of business, and it
cannot be supposed that those who thus offer their testi-
mony for sale will fail to make their wares attractive to
all purchasers. On the contrary, they trim their sails to
every wind, and change their opinions, as the chameleon
his color, at each new change of circumstances, with the
pleasing frequency of a South American revolution. This
is, of course, disastrous in its effects upon the value of their
testimony; and of all expert witnesses, the professional
one, who offers himself to all comers, is least to be credited.
In view of all these facts-the uncertainty and inexact-
ness of science, the rapid changes in knowledge, the un-
known quantity in the personal equation which finds
expression in hobby riding and professional jealousy, the
unintelligible nature of technical terms, the inordinate
length to which expert evidence is often inflicted on the
jury, its lack of harmony, the natural bias of the witness
to the side by which he is employed, and the danger of
venality-in view of these, it is clear that the testimony of
experts is not only not worth what it should be in theory,
but does not possess the practical value that might reason-
ably be expected to attach to it. The only case in which
it is of real value is when it is harmonious on both sides;
for when it is conflicting, and the jury must choose at ran-
dom which view to adopt, it can no more be said to possess
an actual value than a ticket in the lottery before the draw-
ing. It makes no difference that it may be accepted by the
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jury; its value does not attach until itis so accepted. And
unhappily for expert, evidence, it very rarely happens that
it does not coniflict. ". My own experience," says Mr.
Justice MILLBR, in Middlings Purifier Co. v. Christian,'-
"both in the local courts and in the Supreme Court of the
United States, is that whenever the matter in contest
involvesan immense sum in value, and where the question
turns mainly upon opinions of experts, there is no difficulty
in introducing any amount on either side." This stigma-
can never be removed, and expert evidence receive the
weight which it ought to possess, until, as suggested by
Judge TEMPLE, in a case alr.eady cited,' the selection of
expert witnesses is taken. out of the hand of- the parties,
and lkft to the discretion of the Court, so that they may be
removed from all possible suspicion of bias and venality,
and act, not as advocates of either pafty, but as a sort' of
scientific amid curz .
14 Dill., 4S.
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